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ABSTRACT 
Objective: To evaluate the theory of mind in autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and control individuals by applying the Strange Stories test 
that was translated and adapted to the Portuguese language. Method: Twenty-eight children with ASD and 56 controls who were all male 
and aged between 6 and 12 years participated in the study. Results: There were significant differences between the median scores of the 
groups for each of the 12 stories of the test and for the sum total of all the median scores. The median scores for all stories were significantly 
greater in the control group than those in the experimental group (children with ASD). In addition, the protocol had excellent internal consis-
tency. Conclusion: The theory of mind skills assessed with the Strange Stories test indicated alterations in children with ASD compared with 
children in the control group. 
Keywords: child developmental disorders, pervasive, autism, theory of mind.
RESUMO 
Objetivo: Avaliação de habilidades de Teoria da Mente em indivíduos com Transtornos do Espectro do Autismo (TEA) e indivíduos-controle, 
com a aplicação do teste Strange Stories, traduzido e adaptado para a Língua Portuguesa. Método: Participaram do estudo 28 crianças com 
TEA e 56 crianças-controle, todas do sexo masculino e na faixa etária entre seis e 12 anos. Resultados: Foram observadas diferenças signi-
ficativas entre os escores médios dos grupos em cada uma das 12 histórias do teste e na soma dos escores de todas as histórias. Os escores 
médios registrados para todas as histórias foram significativamente maiores no grupo-controle do que no grupo experimental (crianças 
com TEA). Observou-se ótima consistência interna do protocolo. Conclusão: As habilidades de Teoria da Mente avaliadas pelo teste Strange 
Stories se mostraram alteradas no grupo de crianças com TEA quando comparadas às crianças do grupo-controle.
Palavras-chave: transtornos globais do desenvolvimento, autismo, teoria da mente.
In an attempt to identify and characterize the most com-
mon symptoms that make up autism, Wing and Gould1 have 
described the following triad of very specific behaviors and 
characteristics of the disorder: severely handicapped social 
interactions, severe difficulties in verbal and nonverbal com-
munications, and absence of imaginative activities, with the 
presence of repeated and stereotyped behaviors. Currently, 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV)2 and the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD-10)3 use the term pervasive developmental disorders 
(PDD) to characterize these conditions. Rutter4 has empha-
sized that the increase in autism diagnoses in the last 40 years 
demands the introduction of the idea of autism spectrum 
disorders (ASD). In this study, the term ASD will be used to 
refer to subjects with the diagnoses of autism, Asperger’s 
 syndrome, and PDD not otherwise specified (PDDNOS) to 
take into account the similar manifestations that are en co un-
tered in subjects with these diagnoses. 
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Individuals with ASD face many difficulties, and throughout 
the years, these have been attributed to social, affective, and 
cognitive deficits. The two main theories that are currently 
discussed in relation to the primary prejudices of subjects 
with ASD are developmental and cognitive theories. Among 
the cognitive theories, the theory of mind is often used to ex-
plain the cognitive characteristics of individuals with ASD. 
Uta Frith5 and Simon Baron-Cohen6 have suggested that cog-
nitive deficits are the primary deficits in the develop ment of 
individuals with ASD. The authors have described difficulties 
or inabilities of these individuals to comprehend the point 
of view of others, to have a mental image, or to form a self- 
representation of reality. This model is called the theory of 
mind5, 6. Baron-Cohen7 has used the term “mindblindness” 
to describe the deficits of individuals with ASD according to 
the theory of mind. Due to their intelligence and preserved 
speech, individuals with Asperger’s syndrome can make use 
of strategies to compensate for their difficulties according to 
the theory of mind, and these strategies should not be con-
fused with adequate social competence7.
It was with this in mind that Happé8, 9 created the advanced 
test of the theory of mind Strange Stories (SS), in which little 
skits or stories about everyday situations involving people 
saying things that they do not mean literally, are presented 
to the autistic child. Other studies have replicated the use of 
this test10-13, and they have found that, relative to the control 
group, individuals with ASD do not respond adequately to 
the stories, even when they exhibit positive results in other 
theory of mind tests.
This study was developed with the objectives of eva­
luating the theory of mind test in Brazilian children with 
ASD and comparing children with ASD with controls (chil-
dren without the disorder). The age of the children ranged 
from 6 to 12 years. The advanced SS test, which was trans-
lated and adapted to the Portuguese language, was used in 
the study. 
METhOd
This study was evaluated by the Ethics Committee of the 
Mackenzie Presbyterian University who approved all the 
 procedures that were proposed for the research (process 
CEP/UPM n. 1295/10/2010 and CAAE n. 0103.0.272.000­10).
Twenty-eight children who were all male and who had 
ASD (experimental group) and 56 children of the same gen-
der without the disorder (control group) who were aged bet-
ween 6 and 12 years participated in this study. The following 
criteria were used for inclusion in the experimental group. 
1. Clinical diagnosis of PDD according to the criteria 
 pro posed by DSM-IV2 and ICD-103. 
2. Absence of a low intelligence quotient (IQ). To determine 
this, children were subjected to a neuropsychological 
evaluation, and the Wechsler intelligence scale for children, 
3rd edition (WISC-III)14 was applied. Only the vocabulary 
(verbal scale) and cube (execution scale) subtests were 
used to reduce the WISC-III test. Sattler15 has published a 
table that converts the estimated IQs to the corresponding 
global IQs using these two subtests, and this table was 
used in this study. To determine the absence of intellec-
tual deficiencies, an IQ of 70 was used as the cutoff point 
for inclusion.
3. Speaks a response, even if only single words.
Children were excluded from the study if they had lis-
tening and/or visual deficiencies or any other development 
disorders as well as possible neurological or psychiatric 
co morbidities. 
All children were selected and included in this study after 
their parents or proxy gave their consent to be included. 
Children with ASD were selected randomly after we di-
vulged the search for subjects for the experimental part of 
the study. This investigation and other data collection were 
conducted at the Autism Spectrum Disorders Clinic, which 
is linked to the Postgraduate Program in Developmental 
Disorders at Mackenzie Presbyterian University. In the clinic, 
children were subjected to neuropsychological and speech-
therapy evaluations as well as physical and neurologi cal 
exams. The subjects were identified and removed from the 
routine clinical standardized protocol. The data were col ­
lected in a long interview with the parents and/or proxy of 
the individual being evaluated. 
The control group consisted of 56 male children who 
were selected according to the same inclusion criteria, ex-
cept those diagnosed with ASD and were assigned to the 
experimen tal group. Children who complained of learning 
difficulties or listening and/or visual deficiencies or those 
that had any other developmental disorders and possible 
neurological and psychiatric disorders were excluded.
Children without developmental disorders were selected 
from the general population at a social center that was loca-
ted in the city of São Paulo. All male children from 6 to 12 
years of age who matriculated at this center were part of the 
control group. A letter of intent and terms of consent were 
given to the parents and/or proxy of these 56 children in the 
control group and then submitted to the institution after 
their approval. 
In the first phase of the study, the advanced test of the 
theory of mind SS9 was translated to the Portuguese lan-
guage. First, two translations were done by independent and 
Brazilian translators. Second, a synthesis of the two transla-
tions was conducted. Third, the two translators proceeded to 
back­translate the final version. In the fourth and last phase, 
the final translation and back­translation were undertaken 
by a committee of 6 bilingual language specialists. The rate 
of concurrence was calculated at 100%. After all the judges’ 
suggestions and after a consensus was reached with regard 
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All the children’s answers were recorded to be scored 
and analyze later. A numerical register was used for the 
 answers to the second question, with the intent of objectively 
verifying if children had interpreted the story correctly. Thus, 
if the child answered incorrectly or referred to the physical 
state (aspects of physical appearance, physical events, or re-
sults), the score was 0. When the child gave answers for the 
mental state that involved thoughts, feelings, desires, traces, 
and dispositions (i.e., using words such as want, happy, fear, 
think, play, pretend, lie, fooling someone, or waiting for some-
thing), the answer was characterized as a partial or total 
mental state attribute. When a partial mental state was indi-
cated by the subject, despite including the mental state, the 
answer was given a score of 1 because the subject did not 
fully comprehend the exact state. When defining the total 
mental state, in other words, answers indicating complete 
comprehension and interpretation were given a score of 2. 
Therefore, the scoring for each subject could vary between 0 
and 24 points, and the greater the score, the better the com-
prehension and interpretation of the stories. 
The story involving double bluff included three questions, 
and the answer given to the third question was analyzed. 
Below you will find an example of the story and the points 
 attributed to it based on the study by O’Hare et al16.
Story 1 (Lie): 
Answers:
­ Example of an incorrect answer (score 0): “He didn’t have 
a toothache.”
­ Example of an answer referring to the physical state 
 (score 0): “He had a toothache.” 
­ Example of an answer referring to the partial mental state 
(score 1): “He doesn’t like to go to the dentist.” 
­ Example of an answer referring to the total mental state 
(score 2): “He doesn’t want to go to the dentist.” 
RESULTS
For the statistical analysis of this study, a significance 
level of 0.05 (5%) was adopted. Throughout the study, all 
cons tructed confidence intervals were equivalent to 95%. 
Parametric statistics were used as the data were quantitative 
and continuous. The normality of the residuals was verified 
with this statistical model according to the normality test by 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov.
To better understand the results, the following SS were 
used. SS1, lie; SS2, white lie; SS3, misunderstanding; SS4, 
sarcasm; SS5, persuasion; SS6, contrary emotions; SS7, pre-
tend; SS8, joke; SS9, figure of speech; SS10, double bluff; SS11, 
 appearance/reality; and SS12, forget. 
Initially, the median ages and IQs were determined for the 
experimental and control groups. This comparative analysis 
to the semantic, idiomatic, experimental, and conceptual 
equivalences, the final version that was used in this study 
was created.
In its original version, the advanced theory of mind SS 
is composed of 24 stories that contain different attributes. 
Latter studies have proposed a smaller number of stories 
and more variations to these stories10-13. For this study, the 
same 12 stories were used that were used and presented in 
a  recently published study16 that sought normative data of 
140 typical children and that were extracted from the 24 
stories that were originally published9. Each one of these 
stories  represents an attribute of a mental state. To apply 
the test, each story is read to a child and then the child is 
asked two questions to verify the child’s interpretation of 
the mental state of the character. With the exception of the 
stories about misunderstanding and double­bluff, the ques-
tions were always the same. As previously described by the 
diffe rent studies that served as the basis for this study10,12,13, 
a plastic card with the story printed in 16 size Arial-type 
font was placed in front of the child while each story was 
being read by the evaluator so as to exclude the interfe-
rence of aspects related to memory. These tests were ap-
plied to both the experimental group, as well as the con-
trol group, in exactly the same manner, and then the scores 
were calculated. 
We followed the same procedures as those used by 
O’Hare16. Children were tested individually in a silent room. 
The evaluator began the evaluation by explaining the fol­
lowing. “Here we have some stories and some questions. I will 
read you the stories. I want you to listen carefully and answer 
the questions at the end of each story.” As previously stated, 
each of the 12 stories was selected9,16 to represent an attribute 
of the mental state. The stories were always applied in the 
same order and were read aloud to children. During the rea-
ding of each story and the questions asked by the evaluator, 
the appropriate printed card was also presented. However, 
the child was not permitted to read the paper aloud because 
that could interfere with the evaluation. 
For the answers to the first questions, in other words, “Is 
it true what he (the character says,” each story could be read a 
maximum of two times if the child asked for it to be repeated 
or if he answered “I don’t know” to the question. Children re-
ceived positive encouragement, but they were not given any 
signal regarding to the correct answer. When the researcher 
read the story for a second time, it was read from the begin-
ning. The answer was registered, but the more important 
data for a more detailed analysis were the answers that were 
given to the second question, which evaluated the skill of 
mindfulness. Therefore, after answering the first question, 
the researcher posed the following second question. “Why 
did he (the character) say this?” For this second question, the 
story was re-read to the child until he answered the question 
or justified his answer. 
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between the groups for the two variables was done with ANOVA, 
and the results did not indicate any significant  differences bet­
ween the groups, attesting to the homogeneity of the sample. 
Table 1 lists the median scores that were determined for 
each of the 12 stories for the two groups and relative to the 
total median scores of all stories in each group. Again, this 
analysis was done with ANOVA (Table 1). 
Next, the Pearson correlation was applied separately in 
each group to measure the relationships among age, IQ, and the 
sum of the median scores of all stories (Total SS). To validate the 
correlations found, the correlation test was applied (Table 2). 
Lastly, the alpha index was calculated to measure the in-
ternal consistency of the protocol or, in other words, of the 12 
stories. Therefore, in the control group, the alpha values were 
excellent, which indicated that the protocol had an excellent 
internal consistency (0.953). 
dISCUSSION
The results indicated significant differences between 
the control group and the experimental group in the tasks 
of  theory of mind, even after excluding the possibility of 
 intellectual deficiency. These results demonstrated that the 
experimental group exhibited results that were much lo-
wer than the expected medians for children with typical 
 de ve lopment. These findings were similar to the results of 
studies that used the SS test8-13.
Table 1. Comparison of median scores in the experimental and control groups for each story and the total sum of all stories.
Group Median Score Standard deviation Min Max N CI p-value
SS1 ASD 0 64 1 0.56 0 2 28 0.21 <0.001
Control 1.38 1 0.62 0 2 56 0.16
SS2 ASD 0.43 0 0.57 0 2 28 0.21 <0.001
Control 1.18 1 0.69 0 2 56 0.18
SS3 ASD 0.54 1 0.51 0 1 28 0.19 <0.001
Control 1.14 1 0.67 0 2 56 0.18
SS4 ASD 0.25 0 0.44 0 1 28 0.16 <0.001
Control 1.14 1 0.67 0 2 56 0.18
SS5 ASD 0.07 0 0.26 0 1 28 0.1 <0.001
Control 0.96 1 0.69 0 2 56 0.18
SS6 ASD 0.32 0 0.48 0 1 28 0.18 <0.001
Control 1.39 1 0.62 0 2 56 0.16
SS7 ASD 0.29 0 0.46 0 1 28 0.17 <0.001
Control 1.36 1 0.55 0 2 56 0.14
SS8 ASD 0.29 0 0.46 0 1 28 0.17 <0.001
Control 0.96 1 0.66 0 2 56 0.17
SS9 ASD 0.46 0 0.51 0 1 28 0.19 <0.001
Control 1.11 1 0.71 0 2 56 0.18
SS10 ASD 0.11 0 0.31 0 1 28 0.12 <0.001
Control 0.96 1 0.66 0 2 56 0.17
SS11 ASD 0.36 0 0.49 0 1 28 0.18 <0.001
Control 1.14 1 0.59 0 2 56 0.15
SS12 ASD 0.29 0 0.46 0 1 28 0.17 <0.001
Control 1.2 1 0.55 0 2 56 0.14
Total 
SS
ASD 4.04 4 1.26 3 7 28 0.47 <0.001
Control 13.9 12.5 6.25 2 24 56 1.64
SS: Strange Stories; ASD: autism spectrum disorders; Min: minimum; Max: maximum; N: number; CI: confidence interval.
Table 2. Pearson correlation coefficients for age, IQ, and the sums of scores of all stories in the experimental (with ASD) and 
control groups. 
Correlated variables
Experimental group Control group
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Age versus IQ -0.40 0.037 -0.02 0.875
Age versus total scores -0.13 0.493 0.63 <0.001
IQ versus total scores 0.89 <0.001 0.15 0.259
ASD: autism spectrum disorders; IQ: intelligence quotient.
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In this study, we verified that there was a greater correla-
tion between IQ and the median total scores of the stories 
(positive and significant) in children with ASD. These  findings 
were supported by the fact that children with ASD who had 
a greater intellectual performance were able to create more 
compensatory strategies for responding to the tests. A simi-
lar correlation has been described in a study by Kaland et al12.
Many studies have indicated that high-functioning  au tistic 
individuals, such as those with Asperger’s syndrome,  exhibit 
good performances in the usual tasks of the theory of mind. 
However, when the tests are more complex and involve social 
context, a prejudice of these individuals is noted9,17. For this 
reason, a more sophisticated test that involves the skills stu-
died here is necessary. 
There was a significantly negative correlation between 
age and IQ in this same experimental group, and this was not 
observed in the control group. This correlation might indi-
cate a characteristic that is peculiar to the group with ASD 
who were selected for this sample and that did not interfere 
directly with the general results as there was no significant 
differences between the groups for median age and IQ. In the 
analysis that was done on the data from the control group, 
the correlation between age and the total score of the sto-
ries was positive and significant. This result was in agreement 
with the results of a study done by O’Hare et al16. 
Hermelin and O’Connor18 have suggested that some in-
dividuals make use of cognitive mechanisms in order to 
deal with questions about affective processes and that, 
many times, these cognitive mechanisms cause these in -
dividuals to have insufficient answers to these questions, 
indicating  inadequate responses in situations of social in -
teraction. Thus, they feel strange in these situations. No ­
netheless, these strategies do not affect all the social situa-
tions that involve the complex theory of mind, as was the 
case in this study. 
The internal consistency of the protocol that was used 
in this study was measured. In the control group, the va-
lues indicated high internal consistency in that the pre-
sented  results were consistent in children with typical de-
velopment and that the answers increased adequately with 
increasing age, indica ting the viability of this test for use in 
the Brazilian population. 
During the application of the test, it was observed that 
many of the participants in the group with ASD supplied 
 correct or partially correct answers but that these answers 
were given, many times, in an idiosyncratic manner. They 
mostly presented short answers to the questions and, when 
the answers were longer, they responded with elements that 
had little relevance. A study by Loth et al19 reported that 
 individuals with ASD have difficulty learning elements that 
are relevant to the context. Very possibly, the individuals 
that participated in this research were not attentive to the 
 aspects that were relevant for the adequate interpretation of 
the mental states in the stories. 
Many individuals in the experimental group tended to 
give literal answers about the stories and physical interpreta-
tions of social events. In her studies, Happé8,9,20 has  described 
the prejudices of the theory of mind and the difficulty of 
 individuals with ASD to understand nonliteral aspects of 
lan guage, as they have great difficulty in interpreting some-
thing that is not said literally. 
Revisiting the aspects of emphasis and relevance that 
have been described by Sperber and Wilson21 and Milosky22, 
it follows that the understanding of a determinate situa-
tion and social context is maximum when that which is 
most  emphasized is also the most relevant. Beginning with 
the  results that were obtained in this research, the possi-
ble  difficulties that individuals with ASD exhibit in social 
situa tions and in activities involving social contexts were 
discussed because they could present the shortcomings in 
integrating the cues that are relevant for the context and dif-
ficulties in self­representation. These individuals could there-
fore have difficulties with emphasis and relevance, as they 
have difficulty in using the specific aspects of context that 
are required to know what is relevant for the understanding 
of the immediate task. It is probably very difficult for ASD 
 individuals to focus their attention on what appears to be the 
most relevant information available, but, instead, their  focus 
is determined by their objectives and by what interests them 
within the context. It is of extreme importance that the skills 
and difficulties of ASD subjects are evaluated through adap­
ted tests that contemplate naturalistic situations and that, in 
this way, present questions for more realistic answers.
The translation and adaptation of the advanced test of 
the theory of mind Strange Stories and its application to 
 children with ASD and those with typical development re-
vealed that the theory of mind in children with ASD who 
are aged from 6 to 12 years were found to fall short of what 
was expected in children with typical development of the 
same age,  suggesting that children with ASD have signifi-
cant alterations in these skills. The results of this study 
suggested the importance of further research that invol -
ves new analyses (studies of  reliability and evidence of va -
li dity) and discussions. 
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